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ABSTRACT
Challenger parties’ electoral successes have attracted increasing scholarly
attention. Based on the example of West European radical left parties, this
article investigates whether and how centripetal and centrifugal positional
movements on different conflict dimensions influence the election results of
these parties. Depending on parties’ issue-linkages, these strategies will have
a different effect for the economic and the non-economic issue dimension.
Due to radical left parties’ long-term commitment and a strong party-issue
linkage on economic issues, more moderate positions will play to their elect-
oral advantage. In contrast, far-left parties compete with social democratic
and green-libertarian parties for party-issue linkages on the non-economic
issue dimension. Here, they benefit from promoting centrifugal strategies.
Based on time-series cross-section analyses for 25 West European far-left par-
ties between 1990 and 2017, the empirical results show that the success of
radical left parties’ positional strategies varies with the conflict dimension in
question and that this effect is only partly moderated by the positions of
competing mainstream left parties.
KEYWORDS Radical left parties; party competition; electoral behaviour; elections; political parties
In the early 1990s, political observers and scientists alike announced the
death of West European radical left parties (RLPs). The collapse of the
Soviet Union, advancing economic globalisation and the continuing shift
toward post-industrial societies had led them to suspect that parties of the
far left would no longer play a relevant role in European politics (Bell
1993; Bull and Heywood 1994). More than 25 years later, communist and
other radical left parties have undergone a phase of organisational and
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programmatic transformation with the consequence that they have seen
remarkable electoral comebacks (Hudson 2012; March and Keith 2016a).
On average, the electoral support for the West European radical left has
increased from 7% in the early 1990s to 12% in most recent elections.
Although this trend is far from uniform across countries,1 most RLPs
have seen a remarkable increase in their public support in recent decades,
with Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain being the most striking
examples.2 As a result, RLPs even defeated their social democratic oppo-
nents in some of the last elections.3 This development raises the question
of what explains the electoral success of this party family.
An increasing number of researchers have started to investigate the
causes of RLPs’ electoral performances. Two main approaches to identify-
ing the determinants of radical left party success are discussed in the cur-
rent literature. First, studies have dealt with current trends and events in
West European politics – such as European integration or the 2008 finan-
cial crisis – to explain the electoral fortunes of the far left (e.g.
Beaudonnet and Gomez 2017; Dunphy 2004). Second, research has inves-
tigated the influence of individual-level factors from the perspective of
cleavage theory (Ramiro 2016), theories focusing on economic distress
and deprivation (March and Rommerskirchen 2015; Visser et al. 2014), or
modernisation theory (Charalambous and Lamprianou 2017; Gomez et al.
2016). Although some of these studies also address factors related to the
political supply side, little is known about the success and failure of RLPs’
programmatic strategies. More concretely, no study has yet accounted for
the question of how and to what extent RLPs’ programmatic offers affect
their electoral performances. This is surprising since the West European
far left has undergone a profound process of programmatic re-orientation
(March 2011). While a minority of (post-)communist parties continue to
promote a rather orthodox programmatic profile, others have moderated
their stances on economic issues and/or incorporated ‘New Politics’ issues
into their programmes.
This study investigates how the supply side of electoral politics has
influenced the electoral performance of radical left parties. To this end,
the analysis focuses on the positions of radical left parties on the two
dominant axes of conflict in Western Europe, i.e. an economic and a
non-economic dimension. The core argument of this article is that radical
left parties benefit from different strategies on these two dimensions dur-
ing election campaigns. Relying on the Downsian framework of political
competition, as well as on literature on niche and challenger parties, I
argue that radical left parties profit electorally from centrifugal move-
ments, i.e. more extreme positions, when it comes to non-economic
issues, while they benefit from centripetal shifts, i.e. more moderate
2 W. KRAUSE
positions, on the economic conflict dimension. Moreover, the article dem-
onstrates how the success of these strategies depends on the positions
occupied by social democratic competitors. Using data between 1990 and
2017 for 17 West European countries provided by the MARPOR research
group, the empirical analysis shows that the success of RLPs’ positional
strategies does indeed vary with the conflict dimension in question.
The article at hand contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it
facilitates a better understanding of the conditions explaining support for
RLPs. More specifically, this is the first article to go beyond the analysis
of demand-side factors to explain RLP support on a broad comparative
basis. Second, this article adds to the ongoing debate on the electoral suc-
cess of challenger parties. Few studies have considered both dimensions
of political conflict (economic and non-economic) simultaneously when
analysing the effect of positional shifts on parties’ electoral performances.4
I argue that the success of parties’ positional strategies depends on the
conflict dimension in question – an aspect that previous literature has not
explicitly dealt with. The framework developed in this article combines
different perspectives of party competition and is thus not restricted to
radical left parties, but can be applied to other challenger parties as well.
The article proceeds in four steps. First, I discuss how centrifugal and
centripetal movements influence the electoral fortunes of challenger par-
ties in general. The second section presents a series of hypotheses to
explain RLPs’ electoral fortunes from a supply-side perspective. Then the
data, operationalisation, and methodological issues are discussed. The
subsequent section presents the empirical results of the statistical analysis.
The last section discusses the implications of the findings.
Challenger parties’ success strategies: centripetal and
centrifugal movements
This article relies on the insight that challenger parties’5 positional strat-
egies can be distinguished into two groups. The first group of strategies
rests on the Downsian idea of political competition and therefore focuses
on parties’ proximity to the median voter to explain electoral success and
failure. From this perspective, centripetal incentives are present for all
parties within a party system, as voters will vote for the ideologically clos-
est party (Downs 1957). The second group of strategies centres on centri-
fugal positional strategies. Especially political parties that introduce new
issues into the political debate have been found to benefit from policy
stances that deviate from those proposed by competing parties (Adams
et al. 2006; Ezrow 2008). Here, centrifugal incentives drive parties to
more extreme policy stances, as these outsider positions are likely to
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increase parties’ public visibility. Based on this, parties underline their
ideological distinctiveness with the long-term perspective of establishing
issue ownership (Wagner 2012).
In general terms, the Downsian perspective maintains that parties com-
pete with each other by putting forward different stances on a policy
dimension. Parties’ vote shares are the result of the underlying voter dis-
tribution on this dimension, as people – conceptualised as rational actors
– seek to maximise their utility function by voting for the party that is
ideologically most proximate to them. Political parties are thus best
advised to propose centrist policy positions close to the median voter to
attract as many votes as possible. These centripetal incentives equally pre-
vail for challenger parties as they ‘are most likely to survive when there is
an opportunity for them to cut off a large part of the support of an older
party by sprouting up between it and its former voters’ (Downs 1957:
128). Challenger parties thus increase their public support by shifting
toward the position of their closest mainstream competitor. Nevertheless,
putting forward more moderate policy stances does not imply that these
parties abandon their challenger status. Instead, centripetal movements
are a means for such parties to present themselves as more viable voting
options to those parts of the electorate affiliated with mainstream parties.
Challenger parties do not only gain electoral successes by competing
on established policy dimensions but also by introducing new issues into
the political arena. They can thus act as issue entrepreneurs by underlin-
ing the relevance of issues that have been neglected by other competitors
(Meguid 2008). In contrast to the Downsian approach to party competi-
tion, this perspective assumes that challenger parties do not improve their
electoral performance by proclaiming more moderate political programs,
but that extreme positions lead to vote gains (Adams et al. 2006, 2012;
Ezrow et al. 2010). Non-centrist, radical stances are thus a way of attract-
ing public attention by increasing a party’s ideological distinctiveness as
perceived by the voters (Hobolt and de Vries 2015). Based on this
‘product differentiation’ (Kitschelt 1994: 118), extreme stances might also
help to establish a long-term association with a policy field in the voters’
minds that may then translate into issue ownership in the long run
(Petrocik 1996). Both product differentiation and (prospective) issue own-
ership provide strong centrifugal incentives for small parties and are con-
sidered crucial in convincing citizens to vote for challenger parties
(Wagner 2012).
The question remains under which circumstances centrifugal or centri-
petal movements play to the electoral advantage of challenger parties.
Although research widely acknowledges the importance of economic and
non-economic issues in modern societies, analyses that focus on the
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simultaneous relevance of centrifugal and centripetal strategies in multi-
dimensional political spaces are rare. Most of the recent work that is con-
cerned with challenger and niche parties either focuses on the strategic
behaviour of political parties on single non-economic issues such as
immigration, environmental protection, or ethno-regionalism (Meguid
2008; Meyer and Miller 2015; Wagner 2011) or is concerned with posi-
tions on the general left-right dimension (Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow
2008). Few contributions deal with the impact of parties’ positions on
more than one dimension. However, these studies are mostly concerned
with questions related to the predominance of single issues or dimensions
rather than parties’ strategic positioning within this space (Elias et al.
2015; Rovny 2013; Rovny and Edwards 2012). These perspectives do not
take the dynamics of issue competition into account, which leads political
parties to pursue more extreme or more centrist positions on different
conflict dimensions.
One exception is Margit Tavits’ work on ‘principled’ and ‘pragmatic’
issues. Tavits (2007) has shown that parties’ policy shifts are punished
and rewarded by the public in different ways depending on the policy
domain in question. In her setting, voters welcome policy shifts on prag-
matic, i.e. economic, issues, while disapproving shifts on principled, i.e.
social, issues. Based on this, the electoral prospects of challenger parties’
centrifugal and centripetal movements will vary with the conflict dimen-
sion in question. More concretely, I argue that they will depend on par-
ties’ reputation on a given issue dimension. The intensity of party-issue
linkages will influence whether one of these two strategies plays to their
electoral advantage. Party-issue linkages are best understood as co-occur-
rences of parties and issues in the public debate (Walgrave et al. 2012)
and are often considered as the main way to gain issue ownership in the
long run (Tresch et al. 2015; Walgrave and De Swert 2007). Thus, the
more frequently political parties are mentioned in association with a spe-
cific issue, the more will voters accept them as committed actors in the
policy realm in question. This linkage manifests itself as a close identifica-
tion between parties and specific issues in the voters’ minds and is thus
closely related to the concept of associative issue ownership.6
The varying intensity of these party-issue linkages will change the
electoral prospects of centrifugal and centripetal movements. Zons (2016)
shows in this context that challenger parties only benefit from high niche-
ness and programmatic concentration at the beginning of their lifecycle –
i.e. when their linkage with their core issue is still low – and that this
effect fades away over time and even becomes negative the more estab-
lished they are – i.e. when the corresponding linkage intensity increases.
Challenger parties thus profit electorally if they ‘mainstream’ their
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programmatic profiles after they have entered the parliamentary arena. In
the same vein, Wagner (2012) suggests that putting forward extreme pol-
icy stances constitutes a promising strategy when less established political
parties need to attract public attention. Due to their lower vote shares
and a lack of media coverage, this is especially true for those challenger
parties trying to gain visibility on new issues or competing for party-issue
linkages with other parties (see also de Vries and Hobolt 2012: 247).
In contrast, the more a challenger party is a publicly accepted player
on a particular issue dimension, the stronger its party-issue linkage will
be. In some cases, the party might also own some of the issues that are
part of the conflict dimension in question. In this situation, the positive
effect of promoting extreme positions should diminish. Instead, chal-
lengers are incentivised to maximise their vote share to ensure their polit-
ical survival (Spoon 2011). In line with the Downsian framework of party
competition, abandoning policy purism in favour of more moderate posi-
tions is likely to increase their public support. Otherwise they run the risk
of being perceived as political pariahs without any substantial influence
on policies (March and Keith 2016b; Krause and Wagner 2019).
Combining the incentives for centrifugal and centripetal positional strat-
egies in this way conceptualises party competition as a multi-dimensional
endeavour. The outlined theoretical framework is thus sensitive to the entire
‘positional toolbox’ that challenger parties have at hand to gain electoral
advantages. In fact, the intensity of party-issue linkages centrally alters the
prospects for success of centrifugal and centripetal positional movements.
Building on this argument, the next section will elaborate on how these
strategies impact RLPs’ electoral performances. Moreover, I will argue that
these effects will not be uniform for all far left challengers, but will be con-
ditioned by the positions put forward by mainstream left parties.
The impact of differing positional strategies on radical left
party success
Radical left parties are well established actors concerning the economic
conflict dimension. It is especially the long-term programmatic history of
the radical left party family that centres on economic issues such as
socio-economic equality, welfare, or labour rights that dominates the pub-
lic perception of RLPs (March 2011). Rooted in a common communist
tradition, they share a distinctly critical view of the capitalist system and
are united by the aspiration to transform society while rejecting neo-lib-
eral and market-oriented policies (Charalambous and Lamprianou 2017;
Chiocchetti 2017; March 2011). Although their policy goals vary from
programmatic purism as put forward by the Greek KKE or the
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Portuguese PCP to more pragmatic, ‘social-democratised’ policy stances,
all members of the radical left party family have been and continue to be
fierce opponents of public spending cuts and welfare-state retrenchment
(Hudson 2012). Moreover, far-left parties are frequently seen as the asso-
ciative issue owners when it comes to state control of the economy
(Williams and Ishiyama 2018). Based on this, a strong party-issue linkage
on the economic dimension can be expected for RLPs as they are conse-
quently closely affiliated with economy-related issues in the public debate.
In line with the Downsian framework of party competition, favourable
partisan realignment is thus most probable if far-left parties take a more
moderate stance on this conflict dimension. Moreover, centripetal move-
ments may also signal policy pragmatism and prospective governing aspi-
rations that might further boost far-left parties’ electoral support (March
and Keith 2016b). Moderating their position and pursuing a centripetal
strategy is thus likely to increase their support at the ballot boxes.
Hypothesis 1: Radical left parties’ vote shares increase the more they
moderate their position on the economic conflict dimension.
The rise of non-economic issues since the late 1970s not only chal-
lenged traditional patterns of party competition as such (Inglehart 1977;
Kriesi et al. 2008; M€uller-Rommel 1984) but also altered the competitive
environment of radical left parties. As already explained in the ground-
breaking work by Herbert Kitschelt (1994), these new issues opened up
new opportunities (and risks) to attract (and lose) voters in an increas-
ingly fractionalized electorate. Although economic problems constitute the
bread and butter of West European RLPs, they frequently started to pay
attention to new cultural conflicts within society. With the increasing
importance of socio-culturally liberal voters, RLPs underwent a profound
process of programmatic re-orientation and renewal that focused on
including cultural issues, such as environmentalism, gender equality, or
minority rights (Hudson 2000). The most common rationale behind this
process has been to attract new left-leaning voters who were no longer
predominantly concerned with the question of social inequality from the
perspective of class analysis, but who prioritised an idea of equality that
focuses on non-economic categories (Fagerholm 2017). Hence, several
RLPs have started to mobilise those segments of the middle class that are
composed of younger, better educated and more libertarian voters
(Chiocchetti 2017; H€ausermann et al. 2013; Oesch 2013).7
Although far-left parties remain divided on their willingness to respond
to the rise of left-libertarian values, several studies confirm the relevance
of non-economic issues for their electoral performance (see e.g. Hudson
2012; Spierings and Zaslove 2017). Some parties became issue entrepre-
neurs or created long-lasting electoral alliances with green parties and
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movements, e.g. in Iceland, Portugal, Spain, Norway, Denmark, or Greece
(Gomez et al. 2016).8 Other far-left parties are directly competing with
other libertarian and green parties, such as in Germany, France, or
Sweden. In both situations, RLPs need to compete for issue linkage on
these less established ‘New Politics’ issues (see e.g. Charalambous and
Lamprianou 2017). Pursuing a centrifugal strategy in this situation implies
the chance to a) appeal to new voter groups and b) to establish a credible
linkage with these new issues, which can brand them as prospective issue
owners. Otherwise, they possibly lose culturally concerned voters to other
leftist parties or even provide breeding ground for the emergence of fur-
ther libertarian challengers.9
Hypothesis 2: Radical left parties’ vote shares decrease the more they
moderate their position on the non-economic conflict dimension.
While the primary focus of the above explanations is about RLPs’ posi-
tioning in the political space, these supply-side factors do not operate in
an isolated way. As maintained by Spoon (2011), challenger parties’ opti-
mal position can only be understood in relational terms; hence together
with the position of their ideologically closest mainstream competitor.
While, e.g. centrist shifts can have a beneficial impact on challenger par-
ties, this does not imply that these parties can modify their positions
without limitations. Rather, they are best advised to avoid both positional
convergence with mainstream parties as well as too radical a stance that
discourages more voters than it attracts. Whether and how the depicted
strategies affect RLPs’ electoral support thus depends on the positioning
of mainstream parties.
Downs (1957: 131–2) argues that mainstream parties confronted with
parties on their flanks are well advised to adopt some of the challenger’s
position to regain lost votes. Hence, mainstream party movements toward
the extreme end of a conflict dimension are assumed to diminish electoral
support for challenger parties. Although previous work has identified
accommodative behaviour as a frequently used strategic tool of main-
stream parties to deal with radical challenger parties (see e.g. Abou-Chadi
and Krause 2018; van Spanje 2010), we have little empirical evidence indi-
cating that policy-adaption indeed reduces challenger parties’ vote shares.
Instead, Hino (2012) has shown that challenger parties – once they are
more established actors – are unaffected or even benefit electorally if
mainstream parties pay increased attention to the issues they raised.
Although Hino’s study focuses on issue salience rather than positions, it
indicates that accommodative strategies might not affect challenger parties
as expected by the literature.
Two aspects are likely to prevent the success of accommodative strat-
egies. First, the agenda-setting power of mainstream parties in the context
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of multi-party competition might play an important role. As also
acknowledged by Meguid (2008), mainstream parties have the capability
to either put specific issues on the public agenda or to keep them out of
the political debate. They therefore substantially influence which issues
are at stake and which positions are viable options during election cam-
paigns. Mainstream parties exert this influence not only on the basis of
greater legislative experience and governmental efficacy but also by means
of higher media coverage (Merz 2017). As a consequence, smaller political
parties will suffer electorally if their ideologically closest mainstream com-
petitor does not pay attention to issues and positions raised by them.
Second, a closer stance between challenger and mainstream parties
increases the chances of future cooperation in government. Hence, if
mainstream parties promote non-centrist positions, voters possibly tend
to vote for a challenger party because of future government options.
Based on these considerations, I assume that the success of far-left par-
ties’ centripetal and centrifugal strategies is conditioned by the policy pos-
ition of their closest mainstream competitors, i.e. social democratic parties:
Hypothesis 3: The effect of RLPs’ centripetal shifts on the economic conflict
dimension will increase the more mainstream left parties are positioned
toward the leftist end of this scale.
Hypothesis 4: The effect of RLPs’ centrifugal shifts on the non-economic
conflict dimension will increase the more mainstream left parties are
positioned toward the libertarian end of the scale.
Electoral performance and radical left parties’ policy positions –
empirical analysis
Operationalisation and model specification
The research interest of this study on the determinants of RLPs’ electoral
performances requires information on vote shares and policy positions of
West European RLPs between 1990 and 2017.10 The dependent variable
measures the percentage of electoral support for RLPs.11 Following the lit-
erature on radical left parties, opposition to neoliberalism and exceeding
capitalism constitutes the core ideological feature of these parties
(Beaudonnet and Gomez 2017; Gomez et al. 2016; March 2011). In line
with the academic consensus regarding the members of the West
European radical left party family, 25 parties have been identified.12
Radical left parties’ positions on the economic and non-economic conflict
dimension are the first set of independent variables of interest in this study.
The MARPOR project (Volkens et al. 2018) provides information to measure
parties’ positions on both problem dimensions. MARPOR uses manual coding
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of party manifestos, which are divided into quasi-sentences, whereby each sen-
tence is assigned to a pre-designed list of policy positions or areas. As a result,
the percentage of quasi-sentences referring to each code is computed. This
dataset covers the vast majority of elections and parties of interest in this study.
To estimate spatial positions, salience scores for left (libertarian) and right
(authoritarian) categories are combined.13 The use of logit transformed scales
as proposed by Lowe et al. (2011) solves two problems related to the construc-
tion of position scales with MARPOR data. First, former calculations have also
taken the total number of quasi-sentences in a party manifesto into account.
As a consequence, centrist tendencies have been indicated even though the
numbers of quasi-sentences referring to leftist and rightist categories have
remained constant (Fernandez-Vazquez 2014). Second, using log-odds ratios
acknowledges that the marginal effect of additional quasi-sentences is decreas-
ing in the amount that a party has already attributed to an issue.
Higher scores indicate more rightist (authoritarian) stances on the
respective dimension, while lower values implicate more leftist (libertar-
ian) positions.14 Figure 1 shows the distribution of RLPs’ economic and
non-economic positions during the time period that is under investiga-
tion. Although the majority of RLPs’ is positioned in the left-libertarian
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Figure 1. Economic and non-economic positions of West European radical left par-
ties, 1990–2018.
Note: The limits of the scales are identical to the empirical range of positions across all parties in the
MARPOR data set.
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quadrant of the plot, the distribution reveals considerable variation on
both conflict dimensions. The question is which of the positions are elect-
orally advantageous.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 assume that mainstream left party policy stances con-
dition the effect of radical left parties’ positional movements on both conflict
dimensions. For this purpose, the positions of the electorally strongest main-
stream left parties in their respective party systems are taken into account.15
Finally, control variables that potentially influence the electoral perform-
ances of RLPs are added to the model. While macro-economic trends tend
to explain only a small portion of the variation of RLPs’ vote shares (see
e.g. March and Rommerskirchen 2015), it is necessary to control for these
factors. Given that the ideological focal point of RLPs relates to issues such
as social justice, job security, and welfare extension, these parties are
expected to do better in times of economic downturns. Increasing
unemployment rates (International Labour Organization 2019) and decreas-
ing GDP per capita (World Bank 2019) should influence RLPs’ electoral
performances positively. In the latter case, the log of the variable is used to
account for its skewed distribution. Next, the composition of ruling govern-
ments is likely to affect RLPs’ electoral fortunes. Participation in govern-
ment is likely to result in electoral losses due to lacking capacities to realise
promised policy proposals. In addition, I control for RLPs that lend sup-
port to minority governments and left-wing governments without RLP par-
ticipation. A measure differentiating between these three types of
government coalitions prior to the election in question will be added to the
model. The reference category subsumes all governments with at least one
non-left-wing party. Moreover, in some countries multiple relevant radical
left parties compete for votes. Vote gains and losses of rival RLPs are likely
to affect a party’s electoral support. I control for this factor by adding a
continuous measure indicating the vote share gained by all rival RLPs in
the election in question. Lastly, I control for voter turnout since lower par-
ticipation rates in national elections are likely to benefit small parties. Table
1 gives the summary statistics of all variables.
The regression model includes a lagged dependent variable to deal
with problems of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, as suggested
by Beck and Katz (1995).16 Moreover, the model is estimated using
OLS with standard errors clustered by election date and party since the
error terms are possibly correlated within units and over time. Party
fixed effects are added to the right-hand side of the equation to elimin-
ate country- and party-specific heterogeneity. Eliminating in this way
the between-unit variation has the essential advantage that the regres-
sion models provide an estimate of a variable’s average effect within
units (parties) over time.
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Results
Table 2 presents the results for the regression models. Model 1 includes
all variables apart from the independent variables of interest. Model 2
tests hypotheses 1 and 2 by controlling for the positions of RLPs and
mainstream left parties on both conflict dimensions. Model 3 adds two
interaction effects to test hypotheses 3 and 4.
First, the government indicators show a clear pattern across all models.
Participating in coalition governments plays to the electoral disadvantage
of RLPs – the corresponding b-coefficients are negative and significant in
all models. It is also substantial in size, indicating that RLPs’ electoral
support decreases by about six percentage points after government partici-
pation. Interestingly, supporting minority governments does not have a
similar impact – the effects are close to zero and indicate that this strat-
egy comes with less electoral costs for RLPs. The coefficients of the left-
wing government indicator (without RLP participation) have a negative
impact. Hence, RLPs suffer electorally if social democrats are in a ruling
position (compared to governments with right-wing participation). This is
in line with previous findings showing that RLPs especially profit elector-
ally if right-wing governments have been in power (March and
Rommerskirchen 2015).
Next, unemployment shows a positive impact on RLPs’ vote shares.
This is in line with previous expectations claiming that far-left parties
whose core issues relate to questions of social justice and equality do bet-
ter in times of socio-economic downturns. In contrast, GDP per capita
shows a statistically significant positive impact on RLP vote share indicat-
ing that RLPs’ public support rises if the economy is doing better. Also
moderate in size, this effect contradicts previous expectations. This seem-
ing paradox possibly reflects the unequal development of economic
growth and income inequality in Western democracies. Rising economic
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
RLP vote share 120 0.081 0.072 0.004 0.363
LDV 120 0.077 0.071 0.000 0.363
RLP economic pos. 120 1.628 1.080 5.017 0.987
RLP non-economic pos. 120 1.109 1.468 5.252 4.575
MLP economic pos. 120 0.324 0.726 2.760 2.921
MLP non-economic pos. 120 0.701 0.927 4.077 1.316
Unemployment rate 120 9.482 6.125 1.800 25.100
GDP per capita (log) 120 10.309 0.374 9.451 11.468
Vote share rival RLPs 120 0.036 0.073 0 0.387
Turnout 120 0.719 0.112 0.422 0.913
Government
Left-wing gov. 118 0.250 0 1
w/ RLP 118 0.025 0 1
w/ RLP supporter 118 0.042 0 1
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growth is often linked to increasing income inequality, causing increasing
levels of dissatisfaction among voters (e.g. Oishi and Kesebir 2015).
Under these circumstances, RLPs’ might attract those voter groups that
are critical of these trends. Considering the further control variables, the
b-coefficients of rival RLPs’ vote shares indicate, as expected, a negative
impact on the dependent variable. In contrast, the effects of voter turnout
are close to zero.
Let us now turn to the impact of this article’s variables of interest: RLPs’
policy positions as shown in models 2 and 3. Two hypotheses were formu-
lated regarding the impact of RLP positions. While more moderate positions
on the economic dimension should influence RLPs’ electoral fortunes posi-
tively, the contrary is expected for the non-economic dimension. These two
Table 2. Regression results.
DV: RLP vote share
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Gov.: left-wing w/o RLP .013 .009 .012
(.005) (.004) (.006)
w/RLP .088 .077 .071
(.031) (.020) (.015)
w/RLP supporter .011 .015 .018
(.021) (.022) (.020)
Unemployment rate .005 .005 .005
(.002) (.001) (.001)
GDP per capita (log) .007 .024 .024
(.010) (.010) (.010)
Vote share rival RLPs .291 .282 .299
(.100) (.090) (.090)
Turnout .060 .010 .013
(.095) (.100) (.107)
RLP economic pos. .015 .014
(.004) (.003)
RLP non-economic pos. .005 .006
(.002) (.002)
MLP economic pos. .004 .017
(.003) (.005)
MLP non-economic pos. .002 .003
(.005) (.004)
RLPMLP economic pos. .008
(.003)
RLPMLP non-economic pos. .001
(.002)
LDV .646 .567 .557
(.056) (.060) (.055)
Constant .044 .214 .189
(.147) (.135) (.153)
Two-way SE clustering   
Party FE   
N 120 120 120
R-squared .896 .918 .921
Adj. R-squared .858 .882 .884
Note: p < .1; p < .05; p < .01.
FE: Fixed Effects; SE: Standard errors.
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hypotheses find support in model 2. The impact of promoting more moderate
policy positions on the economic and non-economic dimension does, indeed,
differ. More moderate positions on the economic dimension have a positive
impact on RLPs’ vote shares. The statistically positive effect indicates that
RLPs benefit from putting forward a more centrist stance when it comes to
issues such as the welfare state, redistribution, or state interventionism into
the economy. On a scale ranging empirically from 5 to 1, if a RLP shifts by
one unit to the centre of the economic conflict dimension, its electoral sup-
port increases by roughly 1:5 percentage points. In contrast, moderating their
position on non-economic issues influences RLPs’ electoral support nega-
tively. Here, the scale ranges empirically from 5 to 4:5 and a one unit
change comes with a :5 percentage point decrease. Hence, as predicted by the
theoretical framework, radical left parties indeed benefit from a more moder-
ate stance on economic issues while they suffer if they pursue a similar strat-
egy on the non-economic conflict dimension.
To investigate the effects proposed in the remaining hypotheses, two
interaction terms have been added to the model. As stated in hypothe-
ses 3 and 4, the identified effects should be moderated by the positions
of mainstream left parties. The effect sizes of the base terms remain
stable and statistically significant in the third model. Considering the
interaction terms, mainstream left parties’ positions only matter with
regard to the economic dimension. Here, the b-coefficient is – as
expected – negative and statistically significant on the 1% level. In con-
trast, the effect of RLPs’ policy positions on non-economic issues is
not moderated by the policy stances of mainstream left parties. The
coefficient of the interaction term is not statistically significant and
close to zero. Hence, while RLPs lose support at the ballot boxes if
they promote more moderate stances on non-economic issues, this
electoral punishment is not conditional on the strategic behaviour of
competing social democratic parties.
Concerning hypothesis 3, Figure 2 shows the corresponding marginal
effect plot to ease interpretation. The marginal effect is positive and statis-
tically significant if mainstream left parties promote more leftist stances
on economic issues. Moreover, this effect becomes negative if social dem-
ocrats promote more rightist policy positions, thus undermining the legit-
imacy of leftist ideas concerning the economy. Increased levels of
positional competition on the left side of the party spectrum therefore
play to the electoral advantage of far-left parties. The corresponding dot
plot shows the distribution of mainstream left parties’ positions along the
economic conflict dimension. As can be seen, the majority of social
democratic parties are – as expected – positioned around the centre of
the scale. However, one case possibly drives the identified effect, as it is
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positioned toward the rightist end of the scale. Re-running the analysis
while excluding this case does not affect the empirical results.17
The presented results illustrate that RLPs’ electoral fortunes indeed
depend on different electoral strategies. The success of centrifugal and
centripetal movements varies with the conflict axis in question. To sub-
stantiate this finding, a variety of additional models have been estimated.
First, although Sinn Fein is a member of the GUE/NGL group in the
European Parliament since 2004, several studies on the far left exclude
this party from their analyses due to its primary commitment to questions
of national unity and independence (e.g. Beaudonnet and Gomez 2017;
Gomez et al. 2016). Dropping this party from the analysis does not
change the results in substantial ways. The same holds if Syriza – the far-
left party with the most drastic increase in its vote share during the obser-
vation period – is excluded from the analysis.18 Hence, the empirical
results are not driven by possibly influential cases.
Second, including unit-fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable at
the same time in the model possibly produces inconsistent estimates
(Nickell 1981). Excluding the lagged dependent variable from the main
models does not affect the substantial interpretation of the empirical
results. Next, using clustered standard errors for clusters with small sam-
ple sizes might unexpectedly deflate the size of the standard errors. For
that reason, the models have been re-estimated while using only party-
clustered standard errors. Lastly, I also re-run the analysis using country-
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
MLP economic position
M
ar
g
in
al
 e
ff
ec
t 
o
f 
R
L
P
 e
co
n
o
m
ic
 p
o
si
ti
o
n
 
 o
n
 R
L
P
 v
o
te
 s
h
ar
e
Figure 2. Marginal effect of RLPs’ economic positions conditional on MLPs’ eco-
nomic positions.
Note: The dotted lines show 95% confidence bands.
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fixed effects instead of party-fixed effects. In all these cases, the results do
not change substantially.19
Third, Table A6 in the Online appendix tests for alternative specifica-
tions of RLPs’ and MLPs’ policy positions. Entrepreneurial strategies pos-
sibly do not only depend on promoting extreme positions but also on the
salience political parties attribute to these issues (Hobolt and de Vries
2015). The robustness of the results has thus been tested by using an
alternative measure for issue entrepreneurship that combines RLPs’ non-
economic policy stances with the corresponding salience scores.20 Again,
the substantial interpretation of the results remains unaffected if this
alternative specification is applied. Lastly, it is possible that social demo-
cratic parties are not always RLPs’ most relevant mainstream competitors.
I applied a more dynamic approach by replacing social democrats’ posi-
tions with those of the most leftist/libertarian non-RLP party in an elec-
tion. As a consequence, the positions of green parties are used in some
cases. Nevertheless, the results again remain stable and do not change in
fundamental ways.
To sum up, radical left parties’ electoral fortunes depend on different
strategies regarding the economic and the non-economic conflict dimension.
While they benefit from centripetal movements on economic-related issues,
they suffer electorally if they pursue the same strategy on non-economic
issues. These different effects can be explained if the perspective of issue
competition is taken into account. Since RLPs have built a stable party-issue
linkage in the economic realm, they benefit from moderating their stances
on these issues with the goal of attracting social democratic voters.
Concerning non-economic issues, they compete with other leftist and liber-
tarian parties for a credible party-issue linkage in the voters’ minds. For that
reason, they are punished at the polls if they promote moderate stances that
fail to present clearly distinguishable programmatic alternatives. The effect
of these strategic considerations varies partly with the positioning of main-
stream left parties. In contrast to the widely assumed effect of accommoda-
tive mainstream party behaviour (Meguid 2008), more moderate positions
of social democratic parties decrease the marginal effect of RLPs’ positional
strategies on the economic dimension. If the mainstream left takes a non-
centrist stance, they seem to legitimise leftist ideas on the economy and thus
foster the positive effect of RLPs’ positional shifts. Hence, far-left challengers
profit electorally if mainstream parties politicise their core issues and signal
their relevance to the electorate. Considering the non-economic dimension,
this effect could not be observed. Here, RLPs are punished electorally if they
moderate their policy stance. This is true independent of the positional
strategy put forward by mainstream parties. RLPs are thus best advised to
promote an outsider profile on this issue dimension.
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Conclusion
This article has investigated the impact of RLPs’ policy positions on their
electoral support in the context of multi-dimensional party competition.
Moreover, it has shown how these effects vary with the positions of main-
stream left parties. These findings have important implications for the
analysis of multi-party competition and challenger party success.
This is the first study that sheds light on the electoral supply side as a
decisive factor explaining the electoral success and failure of West
European radical left parties. While previous work has predominantly
focused on demand-side factors such as voters’ attitudes and socio-demo-
graphic factors (e.g. Charalambous and Lamprianou 2017; Gomez et al.
2016; March and Rommerskirchen 2015; Ramiro 2016; Visser et al. 2014),
the presented work adds the electoral supply side to these approaches.
Future analyses of parties’ electoral support will thus have to focus on
both voters’ preferences and parties’ offerings.
Second, the results of this study highlight the importance of considering
multiple positional strategies simultaneously when explaining parties’ elect-
oral performances. Previous studies have found that niche and challenger
parties do better electorally when they promote radical policy stances (e.g.
Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2008). However, these studies have been con-
strained to inspecting parties’ policy shifts on a single left-right dimension.
Theory on party competition and voting behaviour gives little reason to
assume that parties’ policy shifts have a similar effect on all subdimensions
of political conflict. Rather, strategies that work on one conflict axis may
backfire if applied to a different dimension (e.g. Tavits 2007). The study at
hand provides a more fine-grained picture of this relationship and shows
that parties’ reputation on specific conflict dimensions (party-issue linkages),
along with the policy positions of competing parties, play a crucial role
when explaining the success and failure of positional strategies. The results
of this article provide empirical evidence that simultaneously considering
the prospects of centrifugal and centripetal strategies is crucial to under-
standing the electoral support of West European radical left (and likely
other challenger) parties.
Third, recent scholarly work suggests that voters do not adjust their
perceptions according to parties’ position shifts (Adams et al. 2011, 2014;
Fernandez-Vazquez 2014). The findings of this article paint a more opti-
mistic picture of the determinants of voters’ choices at the ballot box: par-
ties’ election results do vary substantially with the positions these parties
promote. Similar to Spoon (2011) and Ezrow (2008), this article demon-
strates this effect for the group of non-mainstream challenger parties. The
question remains as to whether the voters of challenger parties tend to
observe parties’ policy shifts more accurately than voters of mainstream
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parties. Analysing far-left voters’ perceptions of RLPs’ positional move-
ments would help to understand the individual-level mechanisms that are
at the basis of the effects identified in this study. Moreover, it seems a
promising endeavour to investigate whether and under which circumstan-
ces centripetal movements pay off electorally for other challenger party
families, such as green parties and the radical right.
Notes
1. In a few cases, such as the United Kingdom, Belgium or Austria, RLPs have
failed to gain electoral ground.
2. Figure A1 in the Online appendix gives a more detailed overview of the
development of RLPs’ electoral support in Western Europe.
3. Such as in Greece since 2012; in Spain in 2015; in Ireland in 2016; in the
Netherlands in 2017; and in France in 2017.
4. Up to now, scholarly work has first and foremost focused on party families
whose public support rests predominantly on politicising issues within the
non-economic dimension of conflict – such as green, radical right and
ethno-territorial parties. See the growing literature on niche parties: e.g.
Abou-Chadi (2016), Elias et al. (2015), or Meguid (2008).
5. The term challenger party refers to those parties that usually do not
participate in government and compete by promoting extreme or ‘niche’
issue positions. Both terms, challenger and niche party, are used
interchangeably in this article. See Hobolt and Tilley (2016: 973–6) for a
detailed discussion of challenger parties and their characteristics.
6. Here, one common survey question to measure the extent of associative
issue ownership is as follows: ‘Can you indicate for the following issue
which party you spontaneously think about when you think about the issue?
This does not have to be the party whose position on that issue you find
most compelling’ (Walgrave et al. 2012).
7. In support of this, recent studies inspecting the effect of socio-demographic
characteristics on RLP support find a U-shaped curvilinear relationship
between voters’ levels of education and support for radical left parties and
ideas (see e.g. Ramiro 2016; Visser et al. 2014).
8. See the country studies in Hudson (2012).
9. Some of the most successful European green parties were able to flourish
while radical left challengers have been absent or electorally insignificant,
such as in Austria, Belgium, Germany, or Luxembourg.
10. See the Online appendix for a discussion of the spatial and temporal
limitations of the analysis.
11. Unless otherwise stated, all variables are provided by the database “Parties,
Elections and Governments” of the WZB Berlin Social Science Center
(WZB 2019).
12. See Table A1 in the Online appendix for the corresponding list of radical
left parties.
13. A vivid debate surrounds the calculation of positional scores from the
manifesto scores. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the various
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proposals and their criticisms in detail. See e.g. Gemenis (2013) and Meyer
(2013) for critical evaluations of the MARPOR data.
14. See the Online appendix (Tables A2 and A3) for a discussion of the
MARPOR items selected for constructing the economic and non-
economic scale.
15. Table A1 in the Online appendix lists all mainstream left parties that are
included in the analysis.
16. The corresponding Durbin-Watson-Test statistic indicates that serial
correlation is present if no lagged dependent variable is included.
Importantly, this is no longer the case once the lagged dependent variable is
added to the model.
17. See models 1 and 2 in Table A4 in the Online appendix
18. See models 3 to 6 in Table A4.
19. See Table A5 in the Online appendix for the corresponding
regression results.
20. Hobolt and de Vries (2015) propose to estimate this entrepreneurship
measure by multiplying parties’ salience scores on an issue with the distance
between its party position and the average position of all parties in the system
on an issue. As the presented analysis already controls for the positions of
mainstream left parties, I calculate this score by multiplying RLPs’ salience
and position scores on non-economic issues. To ease interpretation of the
resulting regression coefficient, both values are divided by 10.
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